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Abstract
We outline an intuitionistic view of knowledge which maintains the original Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics of intuitionism and is consistent with Williamson’s
suggestion that intuitionistic knowledge be regarded as the result of verification.
We argue that on this view co-reflection A → KA is valid and reflection KA → A
is not; the latter is a distinctly classical principle, too strong as the intuitionistic
truth condition for knowledge which can be more adequately expressed by other
modal means, e.g. ¬A → ¬KA “false is not known.” We introduce a system of
intuitionistic epistemic logic, IEL, codifying this view of knowledge, and support it
with an explanatory possible worlds semantics. From this it follows that previous
outlines of intuitionistic knowledge are insufficiently intuitionistic: by endorsing
KA→ A they implicitly adopt a classical view of knowledge, by rejecting A→ KA
they reject the constructivity of truth. Within the framework of IEL, the knowability
paradox is resolved in a constructive manner which, as we hope, reflects its intrinsic
meaning.
1 Introduction
Our goal is to outline an intuitionistic view of knowledge which is faithful to the intrinsic
semantics of intuitionistic logic: the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics. This
view regards knowledge as the product of verification, as suggested by Williamson
[77]. While the standard domain of our theory is the same as that of BHK – mathematical
statements, proofs and verifications – we aim to show that BHK and the resulting intuition-
istic epistemic logic, IEL, also yields principles of constructive epistemic reasoning which
apply in more general settings; specifically, in settings where the notion of a conclusive
and checkable verification makes sense. The resulting framework also offers a natural
constructive/intuitionistic resolution of the Church-Fitch knowability paradox.
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According to the BHK semantics a proposition is true if proved, yet we allow that
justifications weaker than proof can be adequate for knowledge, e.g. verification by trusted
means which do not necessarily produce explicit proofs of what is verified. This distinguishes
knowledge from constructive truth, since the requirements for the latter are more stringent
than for the former. Whereas the classical truth of a proposition is only necessary, but
not sufficient, for it to be known, e.g. it must also be believed on the basis of adequate
justification, the intuitionistic truth of a proposition is sufficient for knowledge, because
every proof is also a verification. Consequently, we have the following contrast between the
classical and the intuitionistic universes: in the classical case the following relation between
knowledge and truth holds,
Classical Knowledge ⇒ Classical Truth
while intuitionistically,
Intuitionistic Truth ⇒ Intuitionistic Knowledge.
This insight is fundamental to the nature of intuitionistic reasoning about knowledge,
and how it differs from classical epistemic reasoning. Intuitionistically the principle of the
constructivity of truth, a.k.a co-reflection:
A→ KA (CT)
is a truism about intuitionistic knowledge – for the aforementioned reason that all proofs
are verifications. Classically, of course, it is invalid because it asserts a form of omniscience,
that all classical truths are classically known.
Classically the principle of the factivity of knowledge, a.k.a reflection
KA→ A (FK)
is constitutive of the conception of knowledge. Intuitionistically, however, it is too strong
and is not a valid epistemic principle, because not every verification yields a BHK-compliant
proof.
Extending the BHK semantics with the notion of verification, and conceiving of intu-
itionistic knowledge as a result of it, yields an intuitionistic epistemic logic, IEL, which
validates CT and falsifies FK.
We begin with a general discussion of these epistemic principles within the BHK and
classical frameworks and give an account of intuitionistic, verification-based, knowledge
(section 2). Since, classically, FK expresses the truth condition on knowledge – that
falsehoods cannot be known – our discussion also involves considering intuitionistically valid
alternative expressions of the truth condition, (section 2.2, appendix B). On this basis we
construct the system of intuitionistic epistemic logic, IEL, formalizing this view of knowledge
and epistemic reasoning (sections 3 and 4). We prove soundness and completeness, and
derive some notable epistemic principles (section 5).
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Another justification for the correctness of our approach is given by the fact that IEL can
be embedded in classical modal logic via the Gödel translation. Just like intuitionistic logic
embeds into S4 considered as a classical provability calculus, IEL embeds into S4 extended
with a verification modality, S4V (section 6).
Finally, we compare IEL to other approaches to intuitionistic knowledge, specifically
in relation to intuitionistic responses to the knowability paradox (section 7). We argue
that previous formulations of intuitionistic epistemic reasoning have not been intuitionistic
enough, and that IEL offers a natural constructive resolution of the knowability paradox.
2 The Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov Semantics and
Knowledge
The Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionistic logic (cf. [14]) holds that a
proposition, A, is true if there is a proof of it, and false if we can show that the assumption
that there is a proof of A leads to a contradiction. Truth for the logical connectives is
defined by the following clauses:
• a proof of A ∧B consists in a proof of A and a proof of B;
• a proof of A ∨B consists in giving either a proof of A or a proof B;
• a proof of A→ B consists in a construction which given a proof of A returns a proof
of B;
• ¬A is an abbreviation for A→ ⊥, and ⊥ is a proposition that has no proof.
Our question is: if we add an epistemic (knowledge) operator K to our language, what
should be the intended semantics of a proposition of the form KA? To answer we need to
clarify what counts as intuitionistic knowledge, and its relation to proof.
That intuitionistic knowledge can be gained from strict proofs is obvious, the question
is whether it can be gained by less strict means also? We propose that intuitionistic
knowledge is the result of verification. We can think of intuitionistic verifications as
a generalisation of the notion of proof.1 Intuitionistically the conception of proof has two
salient features.
1. Proofs are conclusive of the truth they establish;
1In particular, but not exclusively, canonical verification as a generalization of canonical proof, see e.g.
[12, 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 52, 56, 60, 62, 63, 70, 71, 73, 74]. See [78] for some discussion of the nature of
verification and its relation to a generalised intuitionism. Note that a verification in our sense does not
have to be canonical or even a means for acquiring a canonical verification, consider the examples in section
2.1.2. In a more formal intuitionistic setting Williamson reads K in this fashion in his proposal for an
intuitionistic epistemic logic, see [77].
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2. Proofs should be checkable – that something is a proof is itself capable of proof.
The appropriate generalisation of this idea, hence, holds that
1. verifications are procedures that establish as conclusively as possible the truth of the
proposition in question, and
2. verifications are checkable in the weak sense of being public and repeatable, i.e. are
available to anyone appropriately situated, and support counter-factuals that were
the verification repeated it would yield the same result.2
Structurally, proof-based knowledge behaves differently from verification-based knowl-
edge. For example, with strict proof-based knowledge, knowing (having a proof of) A ∨B
yields knowing A or knowing B, whereas for verification-based knowledge, K(A ∨B) does
not necessarily yield that KA holds or KB holds (this will be shown below, Theorem 10,
once the model theory of IEL is developed). A possible (but not the only) way of thinking
about this example is as follows: K(A∨B) states that there is a proof of disjunction A∨B,
but does not actually produce such a proof, or even a means for constructing such a proof.
In contrast, to state that A ∨B is constructively true, one has to assume a specific proof of
A ∨B, which should yield a proof of one of the disjuncts.
Intuitionists, hence, are faced with a choice to either,
• allow knowledge as the result of conclusive reliable verifications that do not necessarily
provide comprehensive constructive proofs, or
• to deny in principle the possibility of such knowledge.
We see no principled reasons for such an a priori denial. Indeed, such a denial yields too
strict a view of constructive knowledge where a proposition is known only when it has been
proved. This view of knowledge is too restrictive; it validates A↔ KA and hence trivializes
the notion of intuitionistic knowledge. Moreover, as the examples in 2.1 show, non-proof
verifications are around and they are used to obtain knowledge; intuitionistic epistemic
reasoning would not be complete without an account incorporating them.
A further question to consider is whether a proposition is intuitionistically true only
if an agent is aware of a proof, or whether the possibility of such awareness is enough?
Traditionally, intuitionism assumes that proofs are available to the agent. For Brouwer and
Heyting proofs are mental constructions,3 and so the existence of a proof requires its actual
construction. This position is the traditional one adopted by verificationists, see e.g. [22,
24, 27].
2E.g. verification by perception; one cannot perceive that a perception is indeed a perception, all one
can do to check a perception is to repeat it and ask others to have it.
3Brouwer [6] considered intuitionistic mathematics to be “an essentially languageless activity of the
mind.” Heyting [42, p.2] says “In the study of mental mathematical constructions ‘to exist’ must be
synonymous with ‘to be constructed.’” See also [40, 41]
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On the other hand some verificationists e.g. Prawitz [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61] and Martin-
Löf [50, 51, 52], consider proofs to be timeless entities, and that intuitionistic truth consists
in the existence of such proofs, and their potential to be constructed.
The principles of intuitionistic knowledge we discuss below are compatible with either
of these positions. Hence, if BHK proofs are assumed to be available to the agent, then KA
can be read as “A is known.” If proofs are platonic entities, not necessarily available to
the knower, then KA is read as “A can be known under appropriate conditions.” To keep
things simple, in our exposition we follow the former, more traditional, understanding. So
to claim KA is true is to claim that the agent is aware of a verification of A.
2.1 Principles of Intuitionistic Knowledge
Given the assumption that intuitionistic knowledge is the result of verification, CT and FK
may be seen as expressing two informal principles about the relationship between truth and
verification-based knowledge:
1. proof yields verification-based knowledge;
2. verification-based knowledge yields proof.
A BHK-compliant view of knowledge accepts 1 and rejects 2.
2.1.1 Proof yields knowledge
The principle that proof yields verification is practically constitutive of the concept of
proof,4 precisely because proofs are a special and most strict kind of verification,
and immediately justifies the validity of the formal principle CT.
That proofs are taken to be verifications is a matter of the ordinary usage of the term
which understands a proof as “an argument that establishes the validity of a proposition”
[65]. It is also a fairly universal view in mathematics (cf. [7, 66, 72]). Within computer
science this concept is the cornerstone of a big and vibrant area in which one of the key
purposes of computer-aided proofs is for the verification of the propositions in question,[10,
11]. Amongst intuitionists the idea of a constructive proof is often treated as simply
synonymous with verification [21, 25, 44]. Hence CT should be read as expressing the
constructive nature of intuitionistic truth, which itself being a strict verification yields
verification-based knowledge.5
4Though not common in mainstream epistemology there are, or have been, mathematical skeptics.
Perhaps the best known mathematical skeptical argument is the one Descartes puts forward in [18], see also
[30, 31, 32]. See also [33] and [45] who both discuss the skeptical consequences of empiricism regarding
mathematical knowledge.
5Martino and Usberti seem to have the informal principle that proof yields knowledge in mind when
they say, [53]: “...[CT] can be interpreted only according to the intuitionistic meaning of implication, so
that it expresses the trivial observation that, as soon as a proof of A is given, A becomes known.”
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According to the BHK reading of intuitionistic implication CT states that given a
proof of A one can always construct a proof of KA. Is such a construction always
possible? Indeed, it is well established that proof-checking is a valid operation on proofs,6
so if x is a proof of A then it can be proof-checked and hence produce a proof p(x) of ‘x is
a proof of A.’ Having checked a proof we have a proof that the proposition is proved, hence
verified, hence known. In whatever sense we consider a proof to be possible, or to exist,
CT states that the proof-checking of this proof is always possible, or exists, in the same
sense. So, by the principle that proof yields verification we have that a proof of A yields
knowledge of A, and by proof-checking we obtain a proof of KA.
We are not, of course, the first to outline arguments that an intuitionistic conception of
truth validates CT, see for instance [17, 37, 46, 53, 54, 55, 75, 76, 79]. Our contention is
that this principle, when properly understood in line with the intended BHK semantics, is
a fairly immediate consequence of uncontroversially intuitionistic views about truth, and
should therefore be endorsed as part of a properly intuitionistic conception of knowledge.
2.1.2 Knowledge does not yield proof
If not all verifications are BHK-compliant proofs then it follows that verification-based
knowledge does not yield proof, and consequently that FK is not a valid intuitionistic
epistemic principle. It is possible to have knowledge of a proposition without it being
intuitionistically true, i.e. proved.7
FK is a distinctly classical epistemic principle, because classical truth is “verification-
transcendent.” Since a proposition can be true even if it is not in principle possible to
know it, if it is classically known then it must be classically true. On the other hand,
for FK to be BHK valid there should be a uniform procedure which given a proof of KA
returns a proof of A itself. Since we allow that KA does not necessarily produce specific
proofs this requirement cannot be met. What uniform procedure is there that can take
any adequate, non-proof, verification of A and return a proof of A? There is no such
construction. Consider the following counter-examples:
Zero-knowledge protocols A class of cryptographic protocols, normally probabilistic,
by which the prover can prove to the verifier that a given statement is true, without
conveying any additional information apart from the fact that that statement is true.
Testimony of an authority Even concerning mathematical knowledge FK fails. Take
Fermat’s Last Theorem. For the educated mathematician it is credible to claim that it is
known, but most mathematicians could not produce a proof of it. Indeed, more generally,
6[1, 36, 43, 48]. Moreover, proof-checking is generally a feasible operation, routinely implemented in a
standard computer-aided proof package.
7“. . .K requires more than warranted assertion. However, it does not follow that K requires strict proof;
that would not be a reasonable requirement when K is applied to empirical statements. . . ”, [77, p.68].
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any claim to mathematical knowledge based on the authority of mathematical experts is not
intuitionistically factive. It is legitimate to claim to know a theorem when one understands
its content, and can use it in one’s reasoning, without being in a position to produce or
recite the proof.
Highly probable truth Suppose there is a computerized probabilistic verification proce-
dure, which is constructive in nature, that supports a proposition A with a cosmologically
small probability of error, so its result satisfies the strictest conceivable criteria for truth.
Then any reasonable agent accepts this certification as adequate justification of A, hence A
is known. Moreover, observing the computer program to terminate with success, we have a
proof that KA. However, we do not have a proof of A in the sense required by the BHK
clause for implication.
Existential generalisation Somebody stole your wallet in the Rome subway. You have
all the evidence for this: the wallet is gone, your backpack has a cut in the corresponding
pocket, but you have no idea who did it. You definitely know that “there is a person who
stole my wallet” (in logical form, ∃xS(x), where S(x) stands for “x stole my wallet”) so you
have a justification p of K(∃xS(x)). If K(∃xS(x)) → ∃xS(x) held intuitionistically, you
would have a constructive proof q of ∃xS(x). However, a constructive proof of the existential
sentence ∃xS(x) requires a witness a for x and a proof b that S(a) holds. You are nowhere
near meeting this requirement. So, K(∃xS(x))→ ∃xS(x) does not hold intuitionistically.
Classified sources In a social situation, imagine a statement of A coming from a most
reliable source but with a classified origin. So, there is no access to the “strict proof” of A.
Should we abstain from reasoning about A as something known unless we gain full access
to the strict proof. This is not how society works. We treat KA as weaker than A, and
keep reasoning constructively without drawing the conclusion that A.
Perceptual Knowledge Under optimal lighting conditions with all my cognitive faculties
working normally I hold up a hand before me and perceive that there is a hand before me.
For all practical purposes this perception is a verification of this fact, so K(there is a hand
before me) holds, but there is no reason to claim having a natural BHK-compliant proof of
this.
If we allow that knowledge may be gained by any of the methods above then FK is not
valid according to the BHK semantics.
2.2 Knowledge and Falsity
Nevertheless FK is taken to be practically definitive of knowledge, especially from a con-
structive standpoint. For instance, Williamson [77], in outlining his system of intuitionistic
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epistemic logic affirms that KA→ A holds. Similarly Proietti, [64], argues that knowledge
is factive in his system of intuitionistic epistemic logic. Wright states that an operator
could not be a knowledge operator if it were not factive [81].8 More generally still the
principle KA → A is probably the only principle about knowledge that has not been
seriously contested.9 And, of course, it is implied by virtually every extant definition of
knowledge. Must not our arguments above be wrong in some fashion? Are we not arguing
the intuitionist is committed to holding that false propositions can be known? No, such a
predicament would hold only if FK failed classically.
Every analysis of knowledge agrees that only true propositions can be known and
that false propositions cannot be known. Apart from FK, there are natural logical
ways to express these:





Intuitionistically 1, 2 and 5 can be considered as saying that knowledge of falsehood is
impossible. 3 expresses that knowledge is stronger than classical truth, and 4 that FK is a
distinctly classical principle.10
Principles 1 – 4 are classically equivalent to FK, and all 1 – 5 are intuitionistically
strictly weaker (see section 3). In this way the intuitionist maintains the impossibility of
knowing false propositions, while holding that knowledge is not factive in the sense of FK.
Which of principles 1 – 5 best expresses the truth condition on knowledge? Any of them
will do, as in the presence of CT all 1 – 5 are equivalent, (see theorem 2); so we pick 5 as
being the simplest.
8“I take this to be a non-negotiable feature of the concept of knowledge. If a theory takes a view of
something which it purports to regard as knowledge, but which lacks this feature, it is not a theory of
knowledge” [81, p.242].
9Hazlett’s [38, 39] would seem to be the only such challenge. However Hazlett challenges the view that
utterances of ‘S knows A’ imply A. Put another way he challenges the idea that the truth of A is necessary
for the truth of the utterance ‘S knows A’; utterances of ‘S knows A’ may be true even if A is false. He
is careful to distinguish this challenge from the claim that it is possible to know false propositions – that
he does not challenge. Hazlett’s arguments do not appear to be relevant to our concerns since we are not
occupied with the truth conditions of utterances of knowledge ascriptions, but the logical analysis of the
epistemic operator.
10This follows from the double negation translation of intuitionistic logic into classical logic and Glivenko’s
Theorem.
8
3 Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic (IEL)
We are now in a position to define a system of intuitionistic epistemic logic which, we argue,
respects the intended BHK meaning of intuitionism and which incorporates a reasonable
verification-based knowledge operator.
IEL is the system of Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic. The language is that of intuitionistic
propositional logic augmented with the propositional operator K.
Axioms
1. Axioms of propositional intuitionistic logic.





Proposition 1 In IEL
1. The rule of K-necessitation, ` A / ` KA, is derivable.
2. IEL is a normal modal logic.
3. The Deduction Theorem holds.
4. Uniform Substitution holds.
5. Positive and Negative Introspection hold; ` KP → KKP , ` ¬KP → K¬KP .
Proof.
1. Assume ` A. By axiom A→ KA it follows that ` KA.
2. By definition IEL contains all propositional intuitionistic validities and all instances of
K(A→ B)→ (KA→ KB), and is closed under modus ponens; by 1, IEL is closed
under K-necessitation.
3. From 1, and the fact that intuitionistic propositional logic validates the deduction
theorem.
4. By induction on the complexity of formulas.
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5. Both are instances of axiom A→ KA, with KP and ¬KP for A respectively.
2
Theorem 1 The following are all theorems of IEL
1. ` ¬(KA ∧ ¬A);
2. ` KA→ ¬¬A;11
3. ` ¬¬(KA→ A);
4. ` ¬A→ ¬KA.
Proof.
For 1:
1. KA ∧ ¬A - assumption;
2. ¬A→ K(¬A) - axiom 3;
3. KA ∧K(¬A) - from 1 and 2;
4. K(A ∧ ¬A) - from 3;
5. K⊥ - from 4;
6. K⊥ → ⊥ - axiom 4;
7. ⊥ 5, 6 MP;
8. (KA ∧ ¬A)→ ⊥ i.e. ¬(KA ∧ ¬A).
For 2, continue with:
9. KA→ (¬A→ ⊥) - from 8;
10. KA→ (¬¬A).
For 3, continue with:
11. ¬¬¬A→ ¬KA contrapositive of 10;
12. ¬A→ ¬KA by ¬X ↔ ¬¬¬X;
13. ¬¬KA→ ¬¬A contrapositive of 12;
14. ¬¬(KA→ A) by (¬¬X → ¬¬Y )↔ ¬¬(X → Y ).
For 4:
1. ¬(KA ∧ ¬A) Part 1;
2. ¬(¬A ∧KA);
3. ¬A→ ¬KA. 2
11With Axiom 2 this gives us A→ KA→ ¬¬A in IEL, i.e. intuitionistic truth is stronger than knowledge
is stronger than classical truth.
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Consider the system IEL0 which is IEL without axiom ¬K⊥. It turns out that IEL0 with
each of ¬(KA ∧ ¬A), KA → ¬¬A, ¬¬(KA → A), ¬A → ¬KA as additional axioms is
equivalent to IEL.
Theorem 2 Each of
IEL0 + ¬(KA ∧ ¬A),
IEL0 + KA→ ¬¬A,
IEL0 + ¬¬(KA→ A) and
IEL0 + ¬A→ ¬KA
proves ¬K⊥, hence each is equivalent to IEL.
Proof.
IEL0 + ¬(KA ∧ ¬A) ` ¬K⊥
1. ¬(K⊥ ∧ ¬⊥), instance of ¬(KA ∧ ¬A);
2. ¬(K⊥ ∧ (⊥ → ⊥));
3. (K⊥ ∧ (⊥ → ⊥))→ ⊥;
4. K⊥ → ((⊥ → ⊥)→ ⊥);
5. K⊥ → ⊥, i.e. ¬K⊥, by ((⊥ → ⊥)→ ⊥)↔ ⊥.
IEL0 + KA→ ¬¬A ` ¬K⊥
1. K⊥ → ¬¬⊥, instance of KA→ ¬¬A;
2. K⊥ → ((⊥ → ⊥)→ ⊥);
3. K⊥ → ⊥, i.e. ¬K⊥.
IEL0 + ¬¬(KA→ A) ` ¬K⊥
1. ¬¬(K⊥ → ⊥) instance of ¬¬(KA→ A);
2. ¬¬¬K⊥ equivalent to 1;
3. ¬K⊥ by ¬¬¬X ↔ ¬X.
IEL0 + ¬A→ ¬KA ` ¬K⊥




Since each of ¬(KA ∧ ¬A), KA → ¬¬A, ¬¬(KA → A) and ¬A → ¬KA can be
regarded as expressing the truth condition on knowledge, we see that the axiom ¬K⊥ is
an adequate intuitionistic expression of this idea. (For further discussion of the intuition-
istic truth condition and the justification for adopting ¬K⊥ as the proper intuitionistic
formulation of the condition see Appendix B).
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3.1 K as ¬¬
Došen [19] proposes an intuitionistic modal logic, Hdn2, in which 2 is read as intuitionistic
¬¬, i.e.
2A↔ ¬¬A.
Hdn2 validates A→ 2A and invalidates 2A→ A. Could Dosen’s 2 be an intuitionistic
epistemic operator?
We argue not. If it were it would follow that all classical theorems are known intuition-
istically. By Glivenko’s Theorem, if Cl ` A then Int ` ¬¬A, and hence Hdn2 ` KA. Such
a K is not intuitionistic knowledge but rather a simulation of classical knowledge within
Int[4].
4 Models for IEL
Definition 1 (IEL Model) A model for IEL is a quadruple < W,R,E,> such that:
1. W is a non-empty set of states;
2. R is a transitive and reflexive binary relation on W , a standard intuitionistic ‘cognition
relation’;
3. E is a binary ‘knowledge’ relation s.t.
• E(u) is non-empty;12
• E ⊆ R, i.e. E(u) ⊆ R(u) for any state u;
• R ◦ E ⊆ E, i.e. uRv yields E(v) ⊆ E(u);
4.  is an evaluation function such that
• u 1 ⊥;
• for atomic p if u  p and uRv then v  p.
Given a model < W,R,E,>, the evaluation ‘’ extends to all IEL-formulas by the standard
Kripke conditions for intuitionistic models:
• u  A ∧B iff u  A and u  B;
• u  A ∨B iff u  A or u  B;
• u  A→ B iff for each v ∈ R(u), v  B or v 6 A;
12Let R(u) and E(u) denote the R-successors and the E-successors, respectively, of some state u
12
along with the Kripkean knowledge condition with respect to the ‘knowledge’ relation E:
• u  KA iff v  A for all v ∈ E(u).
A formula F is true in a model, if F holds at each world of this model, IEL  F , or  F for
short, means that F holds in each IEL-model.
In Kripke model-theoretic terms the intuitionistic truth of A is represented as the
impossibility of a situation in which A does not hold. To represent K in the same model-
theoretic terms we suggest the following: in a given world u, there is an “audit” set of
possible worlds E(u), the set of states E-accessible from u, in which verifications, though not
necessarily strict proofs, could possibly occur. An R-successor of a state u can be thought
of as an “in principle (logically) possible” cognition state given u, and an E-successor can
be thought of as a “possible” state of verification. Knowledge, hence, is “truth in any audit
set,” i.e. no matter when and how an audit occurs, it should confirm A.
That such audits are correct is reflected in the condition that the audit set for any given
u, E(u), cannot be empty since in such u’s K⊥ would hold vacuously, hence ¬K⊥, no
verification can certify a false statement.
Note that E(u) does not necessarily contain u, hence the truth of KA at u does not
guarantee that A holds at u. Therefore, KA→ A does not necessarily hold. In the extreme
E(u) can coincide with R(u), hence an audit can take place in any situation, in which case
KA→ A would hold. Furthermore, the condition E ⊆ R coupled with the monotonicity of
R ensures the validity of A→ KA.
The condition R ◦ E ⊆ E expresses the set-theoretical monotonicity of audit sets with
respect to intuitionistic accessibility. This corresponds to the Kripkean ideology that R
denotes the discovery process (of the ideal researcher), and that things become more and
more certain in the process of discovery. As the set of intuitionistic possibilities, R(u),
shrink, audit sets, E(u), shrink as well. In the limit case where R(u) = {u}, the audit
set E(u) is also {u}, and hence coincides with R(u). Note that at such “leaf” worlds,
intuitionistic evaluation behaves classically; at such a u, u  KA→ A for all A’s. In the
epistemic case, at leaf worlds the reflexivity of K – a typical classical epistemic principle –
holds.
As for intuitionistic logic, we can think of IEL models as representing the states of
information of an ideal researcher, with each state representing the stock of propositions
which are verified at that state. The monotonicity of truth represents the idealization of the
researcher’s memory; once a proposition becomes true, its truth at that state is retained
forever.13
13Our language cannot express this, but we can think of the objects of the ideal researcher’s beliefs as
eternal sentences, stating that ‘A holds at state x’, a model models when the researcher discovers its truth,
and their subsequent retention of it.
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5 Properties of IEL models
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity) For each formula A, if u  A and uRv then v  A.
Proof. Monotonicity holds for the propositional connectives, we show this just for K.
Assume u  Kp, then x  p for each x ∈ E(u). Take an arbitrary v such that uRv and
arbitrary w such that vEw. By the condition on R ◦ E in the model, uRvEw yields uEw,
hence w ∈ E(u). Therefore, w  p and hence v  Kp. 2
Theorem 3 (Soundness) If IEL ` A then IEL  A.
Proof. By induction on derivations in IEL. We check the epistemic clauses only.
1) A → KA. Assume x  A for some arbitrary state in an IEL model. Hence, by
monotonicity of , for all y ∈ R(x), y  A. Since E(x) ⊆ R(x), for any z ∈ E(x), z  A,
but then x  KA as well.
2) K(A → B) → (KA → KB). Due to monotonicity, it suffices to check that x 
K(A → B) and x  KA yields x  KB. Assume x  K(A → B) and x  KA, then all
y ∈ E(x), y  A→ B and y  A, hence y  B. By definition, this means that x  KB.
3) ¬K⊥. Take a state x and y ∈ E(x). This can be done since E(x) is not empty. Since
y 1 ⊥, x 1 K⊥. 2
Theorem 4 (Completeness) If IEL  A then IEL ` A.
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
Theorem 5 IEL 0 KA→ A
Proof. Consider the following model: 1R2, R is reflexive (and vacuously transitive),










Figure 1: Model M1
2
Though reflection does not hold generally it does hold for negative formulas.14
14This is no surprise since a corollary of Glivenko’s Theorem is that Cl ` ¬A ⇔ Int ` ¬A, see [8, 35],
and FK holds of classical truths.
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Theorem 6 IEL ` K¬A→ ¬A.
Proof.
1. K¬A ∧ A, assumption;
2. A→ KA, Axiom;
3. KA, from 1, 2;
4. KA ∧K¬A, from 1, 3;
5. K(A ∧ ¬A), from 4;
6. K⊥, from 5;
7. ¬K⊥, Axiom;
8. ⊥, from 6, 7;
9. ¬(K¬A ∧ A), from 1–8;
10. K¬A→ ¬A, from 9, by standard intuitionistic reasoning. 2
In IEL knowledge and negation commute: the impossibility of verifying A is equivalent
to verifying that A cannot possibly hold.
Theorem 7 IEL ` ¬KA↔ K¬A
Proof. ‘←’ follows by Theorem 6 and Theorem 1 part 4. Let us check ‘→’:
1. ¬KA, hypothesis;
2. A→ KA, Axiom 3;
3. ¬KA→ ¬A, from 2;
4. ¬A, from 2 and 3;
5. ¬A→ K¬A, Axiom 3;
6. K¬A, from 4 and 5. 2
In IEL the impossibility of verification is equivalent to the impossibility of proof, see
section 7.4 for discussion.
Theorem 8 IEL ` ¬KA↔ ¬A
Proof.
1. ¬KA, assumption;
2. K¬A, from 1 and Theorem 7;
3. ¬A, from 2 and Theorem 6;
1. ¬A, assumption;
2. K¬A, from 1 and Axiom 1;
3. ¬KA, from 2 and Theorem 7. 2
Within the IEL-framework, no truth is unverifiable, see section 7.4 for discussion.
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Theorem 9 IEL ` ¬(¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A)
Proof.
1. ¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A, assumption;
2. K¬A ∧K¬¬A, by Theorem 7;
3. ¬A ∧ ¬¬A, by Theorem 6;
4. ⊥ 3;
5. ¬(¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A), 1–4. 2
Intuitionistic verifications do not have the disjunction property.
Theorem 10 IEL 0 K(A ∨B)→ (KA ∨KB)
Proof. Consider the following model. 1R2, 1R3 (R is reflexive); 1E2, 1E3, 2E2, 3E3; p is


















Figure 2: Model M2
Since 2 1 p, 2  ¬p, hence 2  p ∨ ¬p. Since 3  p, 3  p ∨ ¬p. Hence 1  K(p ∨ ¬p).
However, 1 1 Kp, and 1 1 K¬p. 2
While verifying a disjunction does not require verification of one of the disjuncts, it does
require that verification of one of the disjuncts be possible.
Theorem 11 K(A ∨B) ∧ (¬KA ∧ ¬KB) is inconsistent in IEL.
Proof.
1. K(A ∨B) ∧ (¬KA ∧ ¬KB), assumption;
2. ¬KA, from 1;
3. ¬KB, from 1;
4. ¬KA→ K¬A, Theorem 7;
5. ¬KB → K¬B, Theorem 7;
6. K¬A, from 1 and 4;
7. K¬B, from 2 and 5;
8. K(¬A ∧ ¬B), from 6 and 7;
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9. K¬(A ∨B), intuitionistic De Morgan;
10 ¬K(A ∨B), Theorem 7;
11. ⊥, from 1 and 7. 2
Theorem 12 The rule ` KA / ` A is admissible.
Proof. Suppose 0 A, hence, by completeness, there is a model M =< W,R,E,> with a
node x ∈ W s.t. x 1 A. Construct a new model, N =< W ′, R′, E ′,′> such that
• W ′ = W ∪ {x0} (x0 is a new node);
• x0R′u and x0E ′u for all u ∈ W ′, R′ coincides with R and E ′ coincides with E on W ;
• x0 6′ p for each atomic sentence p and ′ coincides with  on W .
Clearly N is an IEL-model. Moreover,M is a generated submodel of N , hence ′ coincides
with  on W . Furthermore, x0 1′ KA, since x 1′ A and x0Ex. Therefore, IEL 0 KA also.
2
Theorem 13 (Disjunction Property) If IEL ` A ∨B then either IEL ` A or IEL ` B.
Proof. Assume 0 A and 0 B. By completeness, 1 A and 1 B. Hence there are models
M1 =< W1, R1, E1,1> and M2 =< W2, R2, E2,2> with nodes x1 ∈ W1 and x2 ∈ W2
such that x1 11 A and x2 12 B. We define a new model M =< W,R,E,> such that
• W = W1 ∪W2 ∪ {x0} where x0 /∈ W1 and x0 /∈ W2.
• x0Ru and x0Eu for all u ∈ W , R coincides with Ri on Wi, and E coincides with Ei
on i = 1, 2.
• x0 1 p for each atomic sentence p,  coincides with i on Wi, i = 1, 2.
It is easy to check that for each i = 1, 2 and each x ∈ Wi,
x  F iff x i F.
We claim that x0 1 A ∨B, hence 0 A ∨B. Indeed, if x0  A ∨B, then x0  A or x0  B.
If x0  A then, by monotonicity, x1  A, hence x1 1 A which contradicts our assumptions.
Case x0  B is symmetric.
2
Despite Theorem 10, IEL has a weak disjunction property for verifications.
Corollary 1 If ` K(A ∨B) then either ` KA or ` KB.
Proof. Assume IEL ` K(A ∨ B) then, by Theorem 12, ` A ∨ B, hence ` A or ` B. In
which case ` KA or ` KB by K-necessitation. 2
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6 Modeling IEL via Provability and Verification.
In [36], Gödel offered a provability semantics for intuitionistic logic IPC by means of a
syntactical embedding of IPC into the modal logic S4 which he considered a calculus for
classical provability. Gödel’s embedding later became a key ingredient of the BHK-style
semantics of classical proofs for intuitionistic logic via the Logic of Proofs, cf. [1]. Though a
faithful intuitionist may question the merits of the very goal of finding a classical semantics
for intuitionistic systems, others, e.g. those who stay within the position of classical
mathematics, could find useful insights from such semantics.15
We will establish the embedding/interpretation of IEL into a natural version of Gödel’s
provability logic S4 augmented by a verification modality, which we suggest calling S4V.
Basically, we will explain IEL via classical provability and verification coded in S4V the way
Gödel explained intuitionistic logic by interpreting it in the logic of provability S4 [36].
System S4V is a classical logic with two modalities, 2 for the S4-type provability modality,
and K for a verification modality. The logical principles of S4V include the axioms and
rules of modal logic S4 for 2 and of the modal logic D for K: K(A→ B)→ (KA→ KB),
¬K⊥. The latter principle reflects our assumption that the verification procedure is sound,
i.e. does not verify false statement. Naturally, S4V includes the connection axiom
2A→ KA,
stating that a proof of A counts as a verification of A.
Since we are in a classical setting why not assume KA→ A as an axiom? Why only just
consistency, ¬K⊥? This turns out to be a delicate issue. If we assume K-reflection, then
we have K2A→ 2A, 2(K2A→ 2A), by 2-necessitation, and then, by straightforward
modal reasoning,
2K2A→ 2A,
which is a classical version (supported by Gödel’s translation) of
if A is intuitionistically known, then A is intuitionistically true.
So, adopting 2-necessitation of K-reflection leads to the collapse of intuitionistic knowledge
into intuitionistic truth, which is not acceptable within our framework.
One way to save K-reflection would be to remove it from the scope of 2-necessitation.
This would lead to a non-normal modal logic and will open many new natural questions,
interesting in themselves but which we leave to future work. As a first step we begin with
a minimalistic, “vanilla”, logic of provability and verification, S4V, all the principles of
which are non-controversial, and which is sufficient both for Gödel’s embedding of IEL and
for distinguishing reflection from co-reflection of intuitionistic knowledge. Certainly we
have no a priori objection to the study of other bi-modal logics of classical provability and
15After all, the paradigmatic Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic is itself classical [14], which does
not make it any less useful and insightful as a tool for studying intuitionistic logic.
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knowledge (which may or may not incorporate reflection) both as a topic interesting in
itself and in virtue of its connections to intuitionistic epistemology.
Definition 2 The list of postulates of S4V consists of
• axioms and rules of modal logic S4 for 2;
• axioms and rules of modal logic D for K;
• 2A→ KA.
Example 1 The following is derivable in S4V: 2A→ 2KA→ KA. Indeed,
1. 2A→ 22A, 2-transitivity;
2. 2A→ KA, connection;
3. 22A→ 2KA, 2-necessitation and distributivity;
4. 2A→ 2KA, from 1,3 by propositional reasoning;
5. 2KA→ KA, 2-reflection.
Now we focus on spelling out how exactly IEL can be interpreted in S4V. Gödel in
[36] offered translating intuitionistic formulas into the classical language with a provability
modality, essentially equivalent in S4 to the rule “box each subformula.” Since 2 denotes
provability, this was for Gödel an elegant syntactical way of representing the truth is
provability paradigm. Gödel’s translation suggests reading Kp in S4V as 2K2p “there is a
proof that provability of p is verified.” Since “provability of X” is the classical approximation
to “X holds intuitionistically,” Gödel’s translation supports IEL’s reading of Kp as
“it is intuitionistically true that intuitionistic truth of p has been verified.”
Definition 3 tr(F ) is the result of prefixing each subformula in F with a 2.
Example 2 Here are some examples of the translation. For brevity, we do not distinguish
equivalent formulas ⊥ and 2⊥:
• tr(p) = 2p, for an atomic p;
• tr(Kp) = 2K2p;
• tr(¬K⊥) = 2¬2K⊥;
• tr(p→ Kp) = 2(2p→ 2K2p).
• tr(Kp→ Kq) = 2(2K2p→ 2K2q).
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Theorem 14 (Provability/verification soundness of IEL).
IEL ` F ⇒ S4V ` tr(F ).
Proof. By induction on derivations of F in IEL.
Case 1. F is an axiom of IPC – this has been checked by Gödel, since our translation
coincides with Gödel’s on intuitionistic atoms and connectives.
Case 2. F is K(A → B) → (KA → KB). Without loss of generality, we can make a
simplifying assumption that A and B are propositional letters. Then tr(F ) is
tr(F ) = 2(2K2(2A→ 2B)→ 2(2K2A→ 2K2B))
which is derivable in S4V:
1. 2(2A→ 2B)→ (22A→ 22B), S4 theorem;
2. K2(2A→ 2B)→ K(22A→ 22B), K-necessitation and distribution;
3. K2(2A→ 2B)→ K(2A→ 2B), by 2A↔ 22A;
4. K2(2A→ 2B)→ (K2A→ K2B), from 3, K-distribution;
5. 2K2(2A→ 2B)→ 2(K2A→ K2B), 2-necessitation and distribution;
6. 2K2(2A→ 2B)→ (2K2A→ 2K2B), from 5, 2-distribution;
7. 22K2(2A→ 2B)→ 2(2K2A→ 2K2B), 2-necessitation and distribution;
8. 2K2(2A→ 2B)→ 2(2K2A→ 2K2B), by 2X ↔ 22X;
9. 2(2K2(2A→ 2B)→ 2(2K2A→ 2K2B)).
Case 3. F is A→ KA. Then tr(F ) = 2(2A→ 2K2A). The proof is as for Example 1
with 2A for A.
Case 4. F is ¬K⊥. Then tr(F ) = 2(2K⊥ → 2⊥)
1. K⊥ → ⊥, D Axiom;
2. 2K⊥ → 2⊥ → ⊥, by 2-necessitation and distribution;
3. 2(2K⊥ → ⊥), by 2-necessitation.
Induction step – modus ponens, covered by Gödel in [36]. 2
As we saw, the co-reflection principle p→ Kp in IEL is valid in the provability-verification
logic S4V (Case 3 above). However, reflection in IEL, Kp→ p, is not valid in S4V.
Theorem 15 S4V 0 tr(Kp→ p).
Proof. First we calculate tr(Kp→ p):
tr(Kp→ p) = 2(2K2p→ 2p)











Figure 3: Model M1
It can be regarded as a Kripke model for a bi-modal language in which R is the
accessibility relation for 2 and E the accessibility relation for K. Since R is reflexive and
transitive, all S4 axioms are valid. Since E is serial, all axioms of D are valid. Axiom
2A→ KA is valid because E ⊂ R. So, any theorem of S4V is true at each node of M1.
It suffices to check that 2K2p → 2p does not hold at node 1. Indeed, 2  p, hence
1, 2  K2p. Hence 1  2K2p, but 1 1 2p. 2
How faithful is this translation to IEL? What does Kp mean in IEL? There are two senses
which IEL can accommodate:
1. It is verified that p holds in some non-intuitionistic, “constructive,” sense.16
2. It is verified that p holds intuitionistically, i.e. that p has a proof, not necessarily
specified in the process of verification.
Our examples (section 2.1.2) of highly probable verification and zero-knowledge protocols
suggest the first sense, while the other examples suggest the second: IEL is faithful to both.
However, the bi-modal language of provability and verification is more expressive and
allows us to distinguish these readings. S4V, clearly, incorporates the second sense above,
by having tr(Kp) = 2K2p.
However the first sense also appears to be a natural understanding of intuitionistic
verification and a constructive notion of knowledge. Following 1 then we would have that
tr(Kp) = 2Kp. However on this reading, Gödel’s translation does not embed IEL into S4V.
The translation of the IEL axiom K(p→ q)→ (Kp→ Kq) is
2K(2p→ 2q)→ 2(2Kp→ 2Kq),
which is not provable in S4V. The matter of how to capture reading 1 of Kp in classical
terms appears to require a different treatment.
The converse of the embedding also holds.
Theorem 16 S4V ` tr(F ) ⇒ IEL  F .
Proof. See Appendix C 2
16i.e. is not necessarily a BHK-compliant proof, but constructive in a more general sense.
21
7 IEL and Intuitionistic Responses to the Knowability
Paradox
What of the knowability paradox? Does it not show the intuitionistic conception of truth to
be absurd?17 Accordingly, must not an intuitionistic conception of knowledge be committed
to rejecting CT, as have intuitionist approaches thus far, e.g. [64, 75, 77]? We argue not.
The proper intuitionistic response is that there is no paradox, see e.g. [28, 46, 53, 67].18
The ‘knowability paradox’ is a paradox only when CT is read as ‘all truths are known’ –
but that holds only on a classical reading of CT and when the idea that “all truths are
knowable” is taken to be the fundamental property of constructive truth. On a proper
intuitionistic view of truth and its relation to knowledge neither of these holds.
Informally the Church-Fitch [9, 29] ‘knowability paradox’ shows that
all truths are knowable
implies





The premise is taken to be definitive of constructive truth, so clearly this is a problem for
such ideas. But only from a classical point of view. From an intuitionistic point of view the
reasoning of the knowability paradox goes in the wrong direction. The fundamental property
of intuitionistic truth is its constructivity, that proof yields knowledge, from which it follows
that indeed all (constructive) truths are knowable. But that is completely unexceptionable.
Intuitionistically the proper order of explanation is that CT implies VK, which depends on
the principle that “what holds is possible,” which appears to be valid on an intuitionistic
reading of 3.
The same holds for the intuitionistic response19 to the paradox which holds that the
proper intuitionistic manner to express the informal idea that all truths are knowable is
A→ ¬¬KA. (IK)
As we have seen (Theorem 1) IK is a simple consequence of a fundamental property of
intuitionistic truth; it is not itself the fundamental property.
17For an overview of the paradox and responses to it see [5], see also [47, 68, 69].
18[53] and [46] in particular make this point by giving the intuitionistic reading of CT its due.
19[16, 28, 67]
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There is no need to show that the Church-Fitch construction is invalid, or that intu-
itionistically it has acceptable consequences. Indeed intuitionistically the Church-Fitch
construction is valid, but trivially – since CT is valid it is implied by anything; but all it
proves is the constructivity of intuitionistic truth.
The knowability paradox is the product of a doubly mishandled attempt to formalize
in classical logic an intuitionistic idea. First by treating the informal principle “all truths
are knowable” as definitive of constructive truth and its relation to knowledge, and then
formalizing it as VK. When the idea is properly translated into classical logic, by taking
the constructive nature of truth properly into account, see [2, 3], no unwanted conclusions
follow.
This means that the intuitionistic responses to the paradox so far are insufficiently
intuitionistic because they commit themselves to the classical reading of A→ KA, and take
it as their task to show it is invalid, when it is in fact central to a properly intuitionistic
account of knowledge and its relation to truth. Moreover these rejections of CT are
usually accompanied by explicit endorsement of the reflection principle for knowledge, which
holds only of classical knowledge. We contend that these intuitionistic responses are not
intuitionistic enough in their view of truth, and classical in their view of knowledge.
7.1 Hart
Hart’s [37] sets the pattern for intuitionistic responses – though Hart himself thinks such
a response is mistaken. On the one hand he canvases an argument that A → KA is
intuitionistically valid and, on the other hand, rejects the conclusion since he takes the
argument to justify that every truth is known. He writes
Incidentally, on an intuitionist reading, it just might be that every truth is known.
For being in an intuitionist position to assert that ∀x(Fx → Gx) requires a
method which given an object and a proof that it is F , yields a proof that
it is G. In the present instance this means: suppose we are given a sentence
. . . and a proof that it is true. Read the proof; thereby you come to know that
the sentence is true. Reflecting on your recent learning, you recognize that
the sentence is now known by you; this shows that the truth is known. If this
argument is intuitionistically acceptable . . . then I think that fact reflects poorly
on intuitionism; surely we have good inductive grounds for believing that there
are truths as yet unknown [37, p.165].
Hart has all the elements for a proper intuitionistic response, and he gives an argument to
the effect that proof (intuitionistic truth) yields knowledge. However he does not apply the
argument to the reading of CT, instead treating his argument that “proof yields knowledge”
as a justification for “all truths are known.” This is unstable, since it requires reading
CT classically; a reading which is intuitionistically incorrect, hence inapplicable to the
intuitionist. One can reject intuitionism altogether and the argument for the validity of
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CT with it, of course, but one cannot argue that a classical understanding of a principle
invalidates an intuitionistic reading of it.
7.2 Williamson
Williamson, in [75, 76], develops Hart’s argument supporting A→ KA, but likewise assumes
that CT is invalid, and seeks to devise a form of intuitionistic semantics which invalidates
it.
To do this Williamson distinguishes between proof-tokens and proof-types. Proof-tokens
are of the same type just if they have the same structure and conclusion, though they may
be effected at different times. Williamson argues that CT holds for proof-tokens; in this
case A→ KA says that any proof-token of A can be turned into a proof-token of KA. But
CT does not hold for proof-types. In the case of proof-types A→ KA says that there is a
function which takes a proof-type of A to a proof-type of KA, which in this context is read
as ‘there exists a time t such that A is will have been proved at t’. Moreover, the validity of
CT requires that this function be unitype, meaning that if inputs, p and q, into the function
are of the same type then the outputs, f(p) and f(q), are of the same type also. Hence “a
proof of A→ KA is a unitype function that evidently takes any proof token of A to a proof
token, for some time t, of the proposition that A is proved at t”, [76, p.430]. Williamson’s
contention is that such a function does not exist in all cases. It exists where we already
have an input for the function, i.e. a proof of A. But in the cases where we do not already
have an input for the function we cannot prove A→ KA holds by deriving KA from A; in
this case all we have to work with is the function f itself, which takes us from hypothetical
proof-tokens of A to proof-tokens of KA. But such a function is not unitype. Assume that
p and q are token-proofs of A of the same type carried out at different times, then f(p) and
f(q) will be proof tokens of different types. f(p) is a proof that KA is proved at time t and
f(q) is a proof that KA is proved at time t′. Hence CT is not generally valid.20
In response, we point out that the BHK semantics has no temporal component.
Williamson’s reading of K and CT introduces a temporal aspect which is extraneous
to the BHK semantics and hence is not one the intuitionist has to accept. It is clear
that Williamson interprets CT as asserting a kind of universal proof-checking (as do we,
see Section 2.1.1), but the time at which the proposition was proved is, normally, not
essential to checking a proof’s correctness. Williamson seems to endorse CT for the original
BHK semantics (e.g. for proof-tokens) but then modifies it by adding an alien temporal
component to devise a reading under which CT could fail. The latter modification is rather
non-standard and consequently does not impugn the BHK understanding of CT.
CT asserts correctly that given a proof, x, of A proof-checking produces another proof,
20See [53] for an argument that such a function does exist; f cannot operate on hypothetical proof tokens,
since they do not exist; so f can still be defined as a unitype function taking a proof of A and returning a
proof of KA. For an objection to this see [54]. On the debate about the status of hypothetical reasoning in
intuitionism see [14, p.30] and the references contained therein.
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y, that there exists a verification of A, namely a proof x of A. As we see CT holds
independent of the time x is carried out or of whether it has already been constructed
or is only hypothetical: proof-checking is a correct procedure that exists independent
of any assumptions about specific proofs. Accordingly, proof-checking does not require
any information about the time at which x was carried out and does not produce such
information.
More fundamentally, we again find the insistence that A → KA is intuitionistically
invalid21 in the presence of arguments justifying the principle that proof yields knowledge,
which can be attributed to a classical understanding of CT. The commitment to a classi-
cal conception of knowledge is even more in evidence in Williamson’s formulation of an
intuitionistic modal epistemic logic [77] in which FK, KA→ A, is endorsed explicitly.
On the other hand, Williamson acknowledges that in an intuitionistic statement KA
need not require strict proof to hold; intuitionistic knowledge is weaker than intuitionistic
truth, i.e. proof yields verification but not vice versa. Accordingly, this exhibits the
same instability found in Hart’s prototype intuitionistic response, which is attributable to
working in an intuitionistic context without achieving a complete liberation from a classical
conception of knowledge.
7.3 Proietti
A more recent development of the basic approach taken in [16] is found in Proietti [64],
who develops an intuitionistic epistemic logic with a Kripkean semantics. Along with
Williamson’s [77] this is the only attempt at a formulation of an intuitionistic epistemic
logic.
Proietti’s basic assumptions follow the pattern for intuitionistic responses to the knowa-
bility paradox: that even under intuitionistic assumptions A→ KA is invalid. At the same
time he assumes explicitly that KA→ A holds in the logic.22 With respect to FK, Proietti
asks “...whether explicit knowledge should validate other, usual axioms of classical epistemic
logic such as T . . . In the case of T the answer is affirmative: the explicit knowledge of an
agent in some given state is likely to imply truth at the same time” [64, p.4]. We have
already argued that this set of commitments is the hallmark of the classical conception of
the relation between knowledge and truth.23
It should be noted, however, that Proietti is not trying to analyze Brouwer’s original
intuitionistic paradigm of “truth as provability.” Proietti’s starting point is rather the later
Kripke semantics of intuitionistic logic, which is not ideologically and technically faithful to
the original intuitionistic foundations. The relationship between truth, proof and knowledge
21“...the assertibility of P , being a decidable condition, seems to guarantee the assertibility of the
assertibility of P , which would then make ‘P → it is assertible that P ’ itself assertible; K in [CT] can be
interpreted as ‘it is assertible that’, and [CT] remains absurd on this reading” [76, p.429].
22Indeed, the intuitionistic epistemic logic he endorses is IntS4, which is intuitionistic propositional logic
with the S4 axioms for K.
23“Even for an ideal reasoner, one cannot equate explicit knowledge and truth” [p.3].
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does not arise in a Kripkean semantic context, since proof is not part of the picture, but
for this very reason the intuitionistic considerations in favor of CT and against FK cannot
come up.
7.4 Percival
Another intuitionistic response, [75], has been to point out that in intuitionistic logic
the Church-Fitch proof yields only A → ¬¬KA. This is acceptable on an intuitionistic
reading, indeed as mentioned some argue it serves as a better intuitionistic expression of the
constructivist’s view than does the classical VK, see [16, 28, 67]. Percival argues that IK is
bad enough since it intuitionistically implies ¬KA↔ ¬A and ¬(¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A), both of
which, he argues, are intuitionistically unacceptable [55, p.183].
The first Percival reads as claiming that the falsehood of A and ignorance of A are
logically equivalent in Int. But, he argues, this cannot be. Assume that ¬A is a mathematical
proposition, hence necessarily true. Whether A is not known, ¬KA, is a contingent matter.
Hence there must be some state of some model where ¬A holds and ¬KA does not. The
second Percival reads as claiming that no statement is forever undecided. This is the
‘undecidedness paradox of knowability’ [5]. He claims that this second consequence is just
obviously false; there exists a p for which ¬Kp ∧ ¬K¬p holds.
We argue that both Percival’s ‘counterexamples’ are valid epistemic principles within
the BHK-based IEL paradigm (see Theorems 8 and 9) and hence do not serve as decisive
arguments against the intuitionistic response to the knowability paradox, or the incorporation
of verification-based knowledge into an intuitionistic framework.
First, in terms of intuitionistic knowledge (IEL) ¬KA ↔ ¬A claims a proof of ¬A is
equivalent to a proof of ¬KA. If we can show that a proof of A reduces to a contradiction
then A cannot possibly hold, hence neither can KA. Conversely, if a proof of KA reduces to
a contradiction then there cannot be a verification of A, but every proof is also a verification,
hence there cannot be a proof of A. The contingency or necessity of ¬A and ¬KA is not
relevant because intuitionistically these are statements about proofs and verifications of
statements – whatever their modal status (cf. [16, p.325]).24
In IEL, ¬(¬KA∧¬K¬A) claims that no truth is unverifiable, not that no truth remains
forever undecided.25 Indeed, by the previous principle if ¬KA held then so does ¬A, i.e.
there is a proof of ¬A, hence ¬A is verified and K¬A. Once again, the contingency of some
agent’s ignorance is beside the point.
Percival’s conclusion that since “[VK] has consequences that are plainly unacceptable
we do know in advance that no intuitionistic defense . . . with a specific semantics . . . is going
24Moreover, it is not clear this argument works in its own terms. If ¬A is necessarily true, then A is
necessarily false, in which case A cannot be known, since for a necessarily false A ignorance of A is also
necessary. Hence there is no state of any model where ¬KA does not hold. Percival’s assumptions appear
to be inconsistent and his argument to violate the truth condition on knowledge.
25Again see [16].
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to work” is false. The intended intuitionistic semantics, BHK, as extended to IEL, is such a
semantics, and in its terms the consequences are quite acceptable.
7.5 IEL and Non-Mathematical Propositions
But there is a further, more general, premise that Percival assumes which he uses to support
his conclusion, and which seems to apply to any attempt to enunciate an intuitionistic view
of knowledge. He argues that “as anti-realist sympathizers . . . admit, non-mathematical
statements aren’t susceptible to proof and a proof-conditional interpretation of ‘→’ isn’t
generally viable. So an intuitionistic defense can’t appeal to it” [55, p. 183]. According to
this line of reasoning an intuitionistic view of knowledge cannot be put in terms of BHK,
because BHK does not apply to all kinds of propositions. A legitimate intuitionistic defense
must give a semantics that holds for all kinds of propositions, not just mathematical ones,
and be “independently plausible.”
We respond that this is an illegitimate constraint on an intuitionistic view of knowledge.
BHK is the intended semantics of intuitionistic logic, indeed the intuitionistic calculus was
constructed to capture the BHK semantics not the other way around. There are, of course,
many non-BHK semantics for Int, but it is acknowledged that they are more or less artificial,
not true to the intentions of intuitionism, precisely because they do not represent the BHK
view.26 To demand an intuitionistic semantics which rules out BHK is, to some extent,
to demand an intuitionistic theory which is not intuitionistic. An intuitionistic semantics
which is acceptable to the non-intuitionist will be either a non-intuitionistic semantics or be
accompanied by an argument guaranteed to convert the non-intuitionist. Neither demand
is legitimate.
The point of the objection is that the BHK interpretation cannot accommodate non-
mathematical truth. But IEL can do this: non-mathematical propositions are a subset of
the verified propositions.
IEL allows us to distinguish two ways in which a proposition can hold: 1) being true
and 2) being a fact. A proposition is intuitionistically true if there is a proof of it. A
proposition is an intuitionistic fact if there is a verification of it. Being a fact is just
being intuitionistically true, in a broad, more general, sense of ‘true.’27 When it comes to
knowledge, the intuitionistic universe is a mirror image of the classical universe. In the
classical universe the set of known propositions is a subset of the classically true propositions,
because knowledge is acquired/formed by adding something to truth. The classical universe
is larger than what is known. In the intuitionistic universe the set of known propositions is
a superset of the true propositions, because proofs are a kind of verification and verifications
determine the extent of the facts. The intuitionistic universe is as big as what is known or
knowable; i.e. the set of facts is “epistemically constrained.”
26See [1, 13]
27We are not supposing anything substantive about the existence or nature of facts. We could have as
easily used the terms ‘true1’ and ‘true2’ for the distinction we are making.
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Hence, in its own terms, a BHK conception of knowledge can make sense both of
non-mathematical propositions and of the intuitionistic consequences of IK/Theorem 1.
Whether those terms should be accepted by everyone, or are adequate for all purposes, is
just the argument over the correctness of intuitionism. But that is a separate question from
that of the nature of intuitionistic knowledge.
8 Conclusion
Since intuitionistic truth, proof, is stronger than intuitionistic knowledge based on verifica-
tion, while classical knowledge is stronger than classical truth, intuitionistic knowledge is,




is not. A proper understanding of the relation between intuitionistic truth and knowledge
shows that the seeming absurdity of both commitments is just an artifact of a classical
view, and justifies IEL as the epistemic logic reflecting the BHK view of knowledge
We would like to think that the system IEL reflects the logic of knowledge an intuitionist
who accepts the possibility of non-mathematical knowledge should accept as best incor-
porating the intended BHK view of truth. But is this generally acceptable as a logic of
knowledge? As with plain intuitionistic logic IEL involves idealizations which some may find
implausibly strong, such as the total recall implicit in IEL models. That may be, but we do
not seek to argue that IEL is better as an epistemic logic than some other, and undoubtedly
just as refinements of basic classical epistemic logic, e.g. by introducing temporal elements
or dynamics, make for more realism, refinements of IEL would too. We have sought only to
outline what a thoroughgoing intuitionistic approach to knowledge looks like, and to point
out that previous attempts so far were not as intuitionistic as they could have been.
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Appendix A Completeness of IEL
We show that IEL is complete with respect to IEL models. First we define what a prime
theory is.
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Definition 4 A set of formulas, Γ, is a theory if it is closed under ` in IEL. That is, for
any F , if Γ ` F then F ∈ Γ.
Definition 5 A set of formulas, Γ, is prime if F ∨ G ∈ Γ implies that either F ∈ Γ or
G ∈ Γ.
The key fact concerning prime theories is the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For a set of formulas Γ and formula F , if Γ 0 F then there exists a prime
theory ∆, such that Γ ⊆ ∆ and F /∈ ∆.
Proof. Since the language of IEL is countable we can list the formulas of IEL X1, X2, X3 . . . .
Now, assume we have a set of formulas ∆0 = Γ, we define a sequence of sets of formulas,
∆1,∆2,∆3 . . . thus:
∆n+1 =
{
∆n ∪ {Xn+1} if ∆n ∪ {Xn+1} 0 F.
∆n otherwise .




It is obvious that ∆ extends Γ and that ∆ 0 F . Indeed, if ∆ ` F then, by compactness, for
some n, ∆n ` F which is impossible. So, ∆ 0 F hence F /∈ ∆.
We have to show that ∆ is a prime theory.
1) ∆ is a theory. Assume for some X ∆ ` X but X /∈ ∆. Take k such that X = Xk,
then ∆k−1 ∪{Xk} ` F , since otherwise Xk ∈ Γk+1 and X ∈ ∆. In which case ∆∪{X} ` F ,
so ∆ ` X → F , but since ∆ ` X it follows that ∆ ` F , which is a contradiction.
2) ∆ is prime. Suppose X ∨Y ∈ ∆ but X /∈ ∆ and Y /∈ ∆. As in (1), both ∆ ` X → F
and ∆ ` Y → F hold. Since X ∨ Y ∈ ∆, ∆ ` F . Contradiction. 2
We now define the canonical model.
Definition 6 The canonical model is a quadruple < WC , RC , EC C> such that:
• WC is the set of all consistent prime theories.
• RC : ΓRC∆ iff Γ ⊆ ∆.
• EC : ΓEC∆ iff ΓE ⊆ ∆ where ΓE = {F |KF ∈ Γ}
• C : Γ C p iff p ∈ Γ, for a propositional letter p.
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Lemma 3 The canonical model is a model for IEL.
Proof. Clearly, ⊆ is transitive and reflexive, hence so is RC . We need to show that EC is
a binary relation meeting the following conditions:
1. ΓEC∆⇒ ΓRC∆
2. ΓRC∆ECΩ⇒ ΓECΩ
3. EC(Γ) is non-empty for each Γ.
1. Assume ΓEC∆ and X ∈ Γ, to show that X ∈ ∆. Since Γ is closed under IEL,
X → KX ∈ Γ, hence KX ∈ Γ, but then X ∈ ∆. Since X is arbitrary, Γ ⊆ ∆.
2. Assume ΓRC∆ECΩ and X ∈ ΓE, to show that X ∈ Ω. Since X ∈ ΓE then KX ∈ Γ.
Since ΓRC∆ KX ∈ ∆, hence X ∈ ∆E. Since ∆ECΩ holds, ∆E ⊆ Ω, hence X ∈ Ω.
3. Now we have to check that EC(Γ) is not empty for all Γ ∈ WC , i.e. that for each
Γ ∈ WC there is ∆ ∈ WC such that ΓEC∆. For a given Γ, consider ΓE. We claim that ΓE
is consistent. Indeed, suppose otherwise, i.e. that ΓE ` ⊥. Then ` X1 ∧ · · · ∧Xn → ⊥ for
some X1 . . . Xn ∈ ΓE. By the usual modal reasoning, this yields ` KX1∧ · · · ∧KXn → K⊥.
Since all KXi are from Γ, K⊥ ∈ Γ as well, which is impossible since ¬K⊥ ∈ Γ (as an axiom
of IEL) and Γ is consistent. By Lemma 2, there is a prime theory ∆ such that ΓE ⊆ ∆ and
∆ 6` ⊥ (hence ∆ is consistent). From the definition of EC , ΓEC∆. 2
Lemma 4 (Truth Lemma) For any formula X, Γ C X ⇔ X ∈ Γ.
Proof. By induction on the construction of X. The propositional cases are standard, we
check the epistemic case only, i.e. when X is KY .
⇒: Assume KY ∈ Γ, and ΓEC∆, hence Y ∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis ∆  Y .
Since ∆ is arbitrary this holds for any state EC-accessible from Γ hence Γ  KY .
⇐: Suppose KY /∈ Γ, in which case ΓE 0 Y . Suppose otherwise (i.e. suppose ΓE ` Y ),
then {A1 . . . An} ` Y for some Ai ∈ ΓE. By the deduction theorem ` A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An → Y
holds. Hence ` K(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An) → KY . Hence ` (KA1 ∧ · · · ∧ KAn) → KY . Now
KA1 . . .KAn ∈ Γ, hence Γ ` KY . Since Γ is a theory, KY ∈ Γ, which is a contradiction.
Hence ΓE 0 Y . By Lemma 2 there is a prime ∆ such that ΓE ⊆ ∆ and Y /∈ ∆. By the
induction hypothesis ∆ 1 Y hence Γ 1 KY . 2
Theorem 17 (Completeness) If  X then ` X.
Proof. By contrapositive. Assume 0 X, which can be read as ∅ 0 X. By Lemma 2 there
is a prime ∆ s.t. X /∈ ∆; such a ∆ is consistent. By the Truth Lemma, in the canonical
model ∆ 1 X, so 1 X. 2
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Appendix B The Truth Condition on Knowledge
We stated above (Section 2.2) that ¬K⊥ is the minimal candidate for expressing the truth
condition on knowledge in an intuitionistic manner. In the presence of CT each of the
alternatives to FK are equivalent (Theorem 2). It is easy to show that in the absence of CT
we get the following hierarchy, from strongest to weakest.
KA→ A
⇓
¬(KA ∧ ¬A) ⇔ (KA→ ¬¬A) ⇔ ¬¬(KA→ A) ⇔ (¬A→ ¬KA)
⇓
¬K⊥
Indeed, one can easily check all these dependencies in the logic IntK, the intuitionistic
analogue of the classical modal logic K. This is IEL with only axiom 2 and the rule of
K-Necessitation. IntK-models are like IEL-models with the exception that only condition
3 holds of the binary relation E: R ◦ E ⊆ E. IntK is sound and complete for this class of
models, see [4, 34].
Appendix C Converse of S4V-IEL embedding
Consider an IEL model M =< W,R,E,>. Clearly we can consider M as an S4V model
< W,R,E,′> by treating ′ as the classical Kripkean forcing. R is transitive and reflexive,
E is serial, and E ⊆ R, hence all axioms and rules of S4V hold in < W,R,E,′>.
Lemma 5 For each IEL-formula F and each u ∈ W , u  F iff u ′ tr(F ).
Proof. A straightforward induction on formula F . We check only the case of epistemic
modality, F is KX. Let u  KX and w ∈ R(u). By monotonicity in IEL-models, w  KX,
hence for each v ∈ E(w), v  X. By the inductive hypothesis, v ′ tr(X). Since v is
an arbitrary element of E(w), w ′ Ktr(X). Since w is an arbitrary element of R(u),
u ′ 2Ktr(X), i.e. u ′ tr(KX).
Suppose now that u ′ tr(KX), i.e. u ′ 2Ktr(X). By reflexivity of R, u ′ Ktr(X)
hence for each v ∈ E(u), v ′ tr(X). By the induction hypothesis, v  X for each v ∈ E(u),
hence u  KX. 2
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Theorem 18 S4V ` tr(F ) ⇒ IEL ` F
Proof. Assume IEL 0 F . By IEL-completeness, there is a model M =< W,R,E,> and a
world u ∈ W such that u 1 F . By Lemma 5, u 1 tr(F ). By S4V-soundness, S4V 0 tr(F ).
2
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[48] M. H. Löb. “Solution of a Problem of Leon Henkin.” In: Journal of Symbolic Logic
20.2 (1955), pp. 115–118 (cit. on p. 6).
[49] P. Mancosu, ed. From Brouwer to Hilbert: The Debate on the Foundations of Mathe-
matics in the 1920’s. Oxford Univeristy Press, 1998.
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